UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-19-2021

State v. Barsuhn Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48188

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Barsuhn Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48188" (2021). Not Reported. 7002.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7002

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
1/19/2021 1:35 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
COLLEEN D. ZAHN
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JAY BARSUHN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48188-2020
Twin Falls County Case No.
CR42-19-6711

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
1.

Has Christopher Jay Barsuhn failed to show that the district court abused its
sentencing discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with three
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction?

2.

Has Barsuhn failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A fast food worker reported to police that Barsuhn drove up to the order window, could
not answer simple questions, slurred his speech, and then drove into a metal post in front of the
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restaurant. (PSI, p.6. 1) A police officer responded and contacted Barsuhn. (PSI, p.6.) Barsuhn
admitted that he had consumed several alcoholic beverages at a bar and then drove to the fast food
restaurant on his way home. (PSI, p.6.) Barsuhn failed the standardized field sobriety tests and
provided two breath alcohol samples that showed a breath alcohol concentration of .170 and .174.
(PSI, p.6.)
The state charged Barsuhn with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.24-25.)
Barsuhn pled guilty. (R., p.39; 3/16/20 Tr., p.9, L.22 – p.11, L.23. 2) During sentencing, the state
recommended a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and a period of retained
jurisdiction. (6/8/20 Tr., p.7, Ls.19-23.) Barsuhn recommended a unified sentence of six years,
with three years fixed, and a period of probation with “successful completion of DUI Court as a
special term of that probation.” (6/8/29 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-8.) Consistent with the recommendation
in the PSI, the district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.109-13; 6/8/20 Tr., p.18, Ls.6-19.)
Barsuhn timely filed a motion for leniency pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (R.,
pp.115-17.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p.119.) Barsuhn timely appealed. (R.,
p.121.)

1

Citations to the “PSI” refer to the collection of documents saved in the record as “Supreme Court
No.48188-2020 Confidential Exhibits Christopher Jay Barsuhn.pdf.” Because these documents
lack any continuous internal pagination, citations to specific pages within the PSI refer to the
electronic page numbers.
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The record contains two transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on March 16, 2020.
Citations to “3/16/20 Tr.” refer to the file titled “20200316 16105 fdc.”
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ARGUMENT
I.
Barsuhn Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, and

retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.109-13.) On appeal, Barsuhn contends his sentence is excessive in
light of mitigating factors and his acceptance into DUI Court and/or outpatient treatment.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.) The record supports the sentence imposed.

B.

Standard Of Review
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of

the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007).

C.

Barsuhn Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of eight

years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. “A sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323,
324 (1982)). Furthermore, where a sentence fits within statutory limits, the appellant bears the
burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. (citations omitted). To carry this
burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.
Id. To establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable
3

minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736,
170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).
A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citation omitted). The district court has
the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the
sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998)
(holding district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment,
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In deference to the
trial judge, [the appellate court] will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146
Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).
Barsuhn concedes that his “sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) The maximum penalty for felony driving under the influence is ten years.
I.C. § 18-8005(6). Here, the district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.109-13). Because Barsuhn’s sentence fits within the statutory limit, he “must
show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view
of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). He cannot do so.
In fashioning Barsuhn’s sentence, the district court considered all of the necessary
sentencing factors as well as the parties’ statements and recommendations, the PSI, and the GAIN
assessment. (6/8/20 Tr., p.14, L.23 – p.16, L.19, p.19, Ls.19-21.) The court primarily considered
the need for the protection of society and the need for deterrence. (6/8/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.16-19, p.17,
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L.25 – p.18, L.5.) In doing so, the court recognized that it could not “overlook” Barsuhn’s criminal
history. (6/8/20 Tr., p.14, L.23 – p.15, L.22.) Based on all of Barsuhn’s DUI convictions, the
court found that “when things get stressful” in his life, he “turn[s] to alcohol” and becomes “a
threat to society.” (6/8/20 Tr., p.15, Ls.17-22; PSI, pp.7-8.)
In addition to the needs of protecting society and deterring future misconduct, the court
found that Barsuhn was “in need of treatment.” (6/8/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.20-24.) The court reviewed
Barsuhn’s treatment history as contained in the PSI materials. (6/8/20 Tr., p.16, L.25 – p.17, L.14;
PSI, pp.7-8, 30.) The court was concerned that none of his prior treatment “seem[ed] to stick.”
(6/8/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.15-19). Indeed, despite receiving prior treatment following each of his prior
DUI convictions, Barsuhn would go on to accrue additional DUI convictions and in this case was
assessed to be a moderate risk to reoffend (PSI, pp.7-8, 16). In order to achieve long-term sobriety,
the court concluded that Barsuhn’s “treatment … cannot be provided outside of a secure setting.”
(6/8/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.20-24, p.18, Ls.14-19; PSI, p.17.) Accordingly, the court imposed the only
sentence that it felt was capable of achieving “the sentencing goals of … rehabilitation, deterrence,
and protection of society” and helping Barsuhn maintain long-term sobriety. (6/8/20 Tr., p.17,
Ls.15-19, p.19, Ls.19-25; PSI, p.17.)
In sum, the court properly considered and applied the relevant sentencing objectives in
fashioning Barsuhn’s sentence.

Therefore, the sentence imposed was reasonable as it was

necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society and the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution. Barsuhn has failed to show otherwise.
Barsuhn argues that “proper consideration of the mitigating factors warranted probation
and a more lenient sentence, especially in light of his acceptance into DUI Court and/or outpatient
treatment.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) However, even considering mitigating factors Barsuhn was
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not an appropriate candidate for probation. In each of Barsuhn’s prior DUI cases, he was sentenced
to serve a period of probation with some component of treatment. (6/8/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.15-19; PSI,
pp.7-8.) Yet, Barsuhn failed to maintain his sobriety and accrued additional DUI convictions.
(PSI, pp.7-8.) Furthermore, Barsuhn was not successful while on pretrial supervision in this case.
Barsuhn missed appointments that he never rescheduled, missed scheduled urinalysis tests,
provided diluted samples, failed to provide a sufficient sample, and tested positive for consumption
of alcohol. (R., pp.53-71; PSI, p.6.) Prior to sentencing, he had already shown himself to be
incapable of successfully completing a period of community supervision in this case. Therefore,
Barsuhn has failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it rejected
his recommendation for a period of probation, especially in light of his poor performance on
pretrial release and his criminal history. (6/8/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.22-24. 3)

II.
Barsuhn Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His
Request For Leniency
A.

Introduction
Barsuhn next asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35

motion. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.) He is incorrect. The district court properly denied the Rule
35 motion.
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Notwithstanding the sentence imposed in this case, the court did not entirely foreclose the
possibility that Barsuhn could participate in DUI court at some point in the future. (6/8/20 Tr.,
p.18, L.12-14.) The court merely conditioned any future participation on Barsuhn’s successful
completion of the retained jurisdiction program. (Id.)
6

B.

Standard Of Review
“‘If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule

35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.’” State
v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 288, 297 P.3d 244, 251 (2013) (quoting State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)); -see --also -----------State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d 381,
385 (Ct. App. 2015) (“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for
leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”). In conducting a review “of the grant or
denial of a Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for
determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Anderson, 163 Idaho at 517, 415 P.3d
at 385.

C.

Barsuhn Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion
The district court did not abused its discretion when it denied Barsuhn’s Rule 35 Motion.

“When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the
Rule 35 motion.” State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013) (internal
quotations omitted). The district court properly considered the criteria for placing Barsuhn on
probation or imposing a term of imprisonment pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2521 and in light of
the new information provided by Barsuhn. (R., p.119.) The court concluded that the sentence
imposed was appropriate and the new information provided by Barsuhn did not compel a reduced
sentence. (Id.) Barsuhn has failed to show otherwise.
Barsuhn argues that the court abused its discretion by not placing him on probation because
the organization that conducted the GAIN assessment had indicated its willingness to accept him
into its programming. (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) However, the PSI recommended that Barsuhn be
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sentenced to a period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.17.) The district court agreed with this
recommendation and rejected Barsuhn’s request for a sentence of probation given his history of
“many DUIs over a period of only ten years.” (6/8/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.22-24.) None of the new
information provided by Barsuhn dissuaded the court from its conclusion that he was “in need of
treatment inside a secured facility as opposed to out.” (Id.) Barsuhn has failed to show that the
court abused its discretion in so concluding.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 19th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of January, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
EMILY M. JOYCE
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
JRP/dd
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